In this paper we study the relationship between foreign currency inter- 
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Introduction
The massive accumulation of international reserves by central banks in Asia and Latin America is one of the crucial policy issues in Pacific Rim
economies.
1 This accumulation of highly liquid assets with relatively low returns is important, as it represents foregone consumption and investment in fast growing economies, and contributes to global imbalances in the form of upstream capital flows.
2 In this paper, we study how the holdings of international reserves depend on interest rate shocks to the interest-bearing assets that constitute international reserves. prospective increase in interest rates in developed economies is one of the most significant near-future challenges for developing economies. Therefore, understanding how reserves relate to global interest-rates is of paramount importance. This paper approaches this question from a monetary perspective and studies theoretically and empirically how international reserve manage-1 See, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2003) , Jeanne (2007) , Aizenman and Lee (2007) and Aizenman and Lee (2008) .
2 See Fukuda and Kon (2012) for an analysis of reserve accumulation on consumption and investment, and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) and references therein for their role in upstream capital flows.
ment responds to interest-rate fluctuations.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
To guide empirical work we solve a simple monetary model of international reserve management. The model is a traditional cash-in-advance small-open economy, which has been used by Calvo (1987) and Burnside et al. (2001) to study balance of payments problems, by Rigobon (2002) to study inflation under fiscal reforms, and by Pina (2015) to study the growth in international reserves. In the model presented in this paper, we focus on the target long-run level of international reserves and on how interest rate shocks may change this target. We also show how studying international reserve transfers, defined as international reserve changes minus interest earned on these reserves, allows us to identify empirically the impact of interest rate shocks on the target level of international reserves, which is empirically unobservable.
We set up the problem of a central bank that has to finance exogenous and stochastic foreign-currency spending shocks with inflation-related revenues, such as seigniorage or deflating nominal debts. Inflation is costly and the central bank wishes to spread costs over time. To do so, it accumulates reserves to smooth inflation against these shocks. Besides managing the stock of international reserves with respect to domestic shocks, the central bank also faces external shocks to the interest rate of its interest-bearing assets.
We compare periods of low and high world interest rates and show that an increase in interest rates increases the target level for reserves and leads to an increase in reserve transfers. We also show that reserve transfers are decreasing when interest rates are constant. These results highlight a relationship between changes in interest rates and international reserve transfers that we can test empirically.
3
In the data section of the paper, we interpret our empirical results using Obstfeld et al. (2010) and Dominguez et al. (2012) .
well as the currencies under which they are denominated.
Using data between 2000 and 2013, we find evidence of a positive relationship between interest-rate shocks and international reserve transfers that is consistent with the model. Under the lens of our theoretical results, this implies that positive interest-rate shocks increase the target levels of international reserves for developing economies. In our baseline regression, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the effective interest rate earned on reserves is associated with an increase in reserve transfers as a share of GDP of at most 0.2 percentage points. We document that this effect is stronger outside of the global financial crisis and robust to using an alternative measure of interest rate shocks. It is also robust to including exchange rate regime controls and country risk factors.
Previous research on international reserves and interest rates has focused on the quasi-fiscal costs of holding reserves, in particular, on the opportunity cost of holding reserves as measured by the difference between interest earned on reserves and the social return of applying these resources elsewhere. Numerous papers, including Heller (1966) , Edwards (1985) and Hauner (2006) , have used alternative measures for this social return. 4 Our results are complementary to this research in the sense that we focus our attention on measuring the relevant interest rate changes for developing economies, and do not take a stance on the correct measure of the social return on capital.
Our approach is closely related to the work by Dominguez et al. (2012) and Dominguez (2012) , who use the same data on the composition of reserves to study how net purchases of foreign currency international reserves impact economic performance. Instead of studying the effects of actively managing foreign currency international reserves, we focus on the impact of external shocks on interest rates on the target level of international reserves.
The next section solves a simple model of international reserves and interest rates. Section 3 presents the data set and tests the predictions of the model. Section 4 discusses our findings and suggests areas for future research.
Model
In this model we study international reserve management using the inflation smoothing approach developed by Calvo (1987) , Rigobon (2002) and Pina (2015) . There are two optimizing agents, a central bank and a representative consumer. The problem of the representative consumer is a standard cash-in-advance model of consumption where consumption fluctuates with inflation. Our focus is on the problem of the central bank. The central bank has access to a non-contingent asset to smooth inflation while facing stochastic financial responsibilities during crises. These are denominated in foreign currency and can take the form of banking sector support or transfers to the government. To finance these expenses, the central bank can either raise inflation-related revenues or use previously accumulated international reserves. Inflation is costly, and the central bank wishes to spread the burden of inflation across time. As a result, it accumulates reserves in normal periods and uses a mix of inflation and reserves during crises. 
Consumer Problem
The representative consumer maximizes the expected lifetime utility from the consumption plan {c t } ∞ 0 . The objective function of the consumer is given by:
where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount factor. We assume that the consumer receives an endowment of y every period and has access to two assets: a foreign bond f that earns the foreign real interest rate ρ, and domestic money holdings M t . Money is valuable in this economy because it is useful for consumption purposes. The opportunity cost of holding money is given by the nominal interest rate, which corresponds to the loss of value associated with inflation plus the return lost from not being able to apply these resources in the foreign bond.
Let P t represent the domestic price level at t, and π t = · Pt Pt the domestic inflation rate (and let the international inflation rate be zero). Assume that purchasing power parity holds, such that the exchange rate is completely determined by inflation. Assume also that all debt is indexed to domestic inflation. 5 Then, the nominal domestic interest rate is given by:
The flow budget constraint of the consumer can be written as:
In addition, the consumer faces a cash-in-advance constraint. To consume c t , the consumer must have real money holdings
Mt Pt
at least larger than c t .
The cash-in-advance constraint is given by:
Define
as the wealth of the consumer in real terms. Because consumers only care about real balances, define real money balances as m t =
. As a store of value, money is always dominated by foreign assets if i t = π t + ρ ≥ 0, which we assume throughout. Thus, the cash-in-advance constraint (3) will always hold with equality and money demand is given by m t = c t . We can then rewrite the flow budget constraint as:
Finally, the consumer's solvency condition is given by:
The problem of the consumer is then to choose a sequence of {c t } ∞ 0 , so as to maximize (1), subject to the flow budget constraint (4) and the solvency condition (5), given {i t } ∞ 0 , f 0 and m 0 . The solution to this problem is greatly simplified by the fact that the consumer has log-utility and by the assumption that the consumer is as impatient as the market. We assume further that the consumer has perfect foresight. Appendix A: Supplementary material shows that the optimal solution is given by:
Equation (6) shows that consumption depends positively on wealth and income but negatively on the nominal domestic interest rate, and therefore, inflation. We focus now on the problem of the central bank and on the management of international reserves.
Central Bank Problem
We assume the central bank is benevolent. It solves a constrained optimization problem: subject to the demands of the government, the represen- , the central bank can pay for spending g t or accumulate international reserves r t that earn interest φ t . Absent any borrowing constraint, the central bank can also borrow from the international bond market at rate φ t . However, since this asset is not contingent on shocks to g t , the central bank does not have access to perfect insurance.
Note that we assume that the central bank has access to different foreign assets than the domestic consumer. In particular, we assume that the central bank can only save in an asset that earns an interest rate that is lower than the interest rate faced by the consumer: φ t < ρ. One justification for this assumption is to consider that central banks are only interested in highly liquid assets such as treasuries or cash, whiles consumers can save abroad in higher return equities. When borrowing, central banks can also have access to lower interest rates, while private agents pay a high cost for borrowing abroad. Because the central bank has access to a lower interest rate but maximizes the utility of the agent, the central bank acts as an impatient agent.
The objective of the central bank is to choose the interest rate i t to maximize:
taking into account the optimal decisions of the representative consumer and the stochastic process for g. To simplify the analysis, we study the case where this expenditure takes one of two values g L , g H , where g H >> g L and g t evolves according to the following Poisson process:
At any point in time, this economy will be in one of two states of nature:
in state-L, expenditure is low; in state-H, expenditure is high. We think of L-periods as normal economic times, and H-periods as crisis periods. A crisis occurs with probability q 1 , and once it occurs, it is over with probability q 2 .
In this paper, we do not distinguish between debt, banking or currency crisis.
Empirically, these crises come associated with costs for the central bank and the government as Burnside et al. (2001) , Burnside et al. (2006) and Laeven and Valencia (2013) show.
The external budget constraint of the central bank is given by:
In exchange for financing g t the central bank gets domestic debt (b t ), either issued by the government or by financial institutions. 6 The balance sheet of the central bank is then given as:
where we assume that the net worth of the central bank is zero for simplicity. Replacing the balance sheet given by equation (11) into the external constraint of the central bank given by equation (10), we can obtain:
Furthermore, we assume that the central bank is constrained to have positive reserves, that is, r ≥ r = 0.
The problem of the central bank is to choose the inflation rate π t , and the domestic nominal interest rate i t = π t +ρ to maximize the consumer's utility, taking into account the influence of the interest rate on private consumption.
This problem can be summarized as follows:
Solution
Appendix B.1: Supplementary material shows that the solution to this problem is given by a system of two differential equations, where we omit time subscripts for simplicity:
Together with the boundary conditions:
The boundary conditions in the high state given by equations (16)- (17) play an important role in our analysis. They put limits on i H and b when approaching from belowb, as a consequence of the constraint on reserves that r ≥ 0. When the central bank runs out of reserves atb t , it is forced to rely completely on inflation to obtain necessary funds, and the interest rate is given byī H t . We can further simplify these two conditions:
Furthermore, holdings of international reserves are represented as:
where m t = ρa 0 +y 1+it
. We define accumulation of international reserves net of interest earned as reserve transfers RT t :
We are now ready to present the main results from the model. Before deriving analytical results we use a numerical example to develop intuition. inflation is increasing while reserve transfers approach the constraint.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
We turn now to the analytical results. In particular, we first show that there exists a target level of reserves in normal times as implied by •
• In state-H the central bank always reduces the level of international We can now study how this results affects reserve transfers. Reserve transfers are given by RT t = · r t − φr t . Replacing · r t we obtain:
In normal times, g t and · m t are small, and the correlation between RT and π t is positive. In crises, however, g t is large. Furthermore, the central bank increases the inflation rate which depresses consumption and the demand for real money balances, making · m t negative. Then, the correlation between π t and RT t turns negative.
9
For a given interest rate φ, the model implies that reserve transfers are decreasing when reserves are below the target level of reserves. This is true independently of the level of desired reserves. In the next section, we study how shocks to the interest rate affect reserves in the long-run.
Shocks to returns to interest earning assets
In this section we focus the analysis on shocks to φ. Given that our interest is in the long-run, we focus our analysis on the target level of reserves.
Consider two levels for φ, both lower than the interest rate faced by the concurrency from other central banks, in the form of swap arrangements (Obstfeld et al., 2009; Aizenman et al., 2011) . Likewise, if the government could issue more debt or collect more taxes, one would expect that the demands from the central bank g would be lower, which would also reduce the central bank's reserve target. Crucially, this access to debt markets or tax revenues would have to be of similar liquidity as the central bank's international reserves. 9 For small g t and
2 > 0, and higher inflation translates into higher RT . For high g t and negative · m t , RT is negative even though π t is positive.
sumer: φ L < φ H < ρ. The previous section showed that, for a given interest rate in normal times, reserves transfers are decreasing when reserves are below the target level. Above the target level, reserve transfers are increasing.
In crisis times, reserve transfers are always increasing.
Suppose the economy is initially in a low interest rate environment. Figure 3 shows that, in normal times, an interest rate hike leads to an increase in reserve transfers. In crisis times, an increase in the interest rate will also lead to an increase in reserve transfers, but this effect is smaller the closer the central bank is to the lower bound on reserves. In other words, the model predicts a relationship between changes in interest rates and reserve transfers, in particular, it predicts that exogenous increases in interest rates should cause an increase in reserve transfers. The intuition behind this result is that higher interest rates make it easier to sustain a larger a long-run level of international reserves, as everything else equal, they make international reserves less costly. In the next section, we test this relationship using a panel data set of emerging countries.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Empirics
In this section we evaluate empirically how shocks to the interest rate earned by foreign-currency reserve assets affect international reserve accumulation. Given that these returns have a direct impact on international reserves accumulation, we focus on international reserve transfers. International reserve transfers are defined as the change in international reserves minus interest income and are therefore not mechanically affected by interest rate shocks, beyond the effect on target levels of reserves. We take the perspective that fluctuations in interest rates of foreign currency international reserve assets are exogenous for developing economies and that central banks are actively managing their total reserve stocks. Building on this perspective, we can then identify the impact of interest rate shocks on reserve transfers by exploring cross-and within-country variation in the exposure to interest-rate shocks. To do so, we use data on the composition of foreign currency international reserves into different types of assets and denominations.
We combine this data with relevant interest rates for different types of asset and denominations, and use it to investigate empirically if the mechanism identified in the model is present in the data.
Measuring reserve transfers
We follow Dominguez et al. (2012) and use the naming conventions from the IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) Reserve template.
Let the stock of international reserves be given by:
where F orexR = SEC t + DEP O t are international foreign currency reserves that can be held as securities or deposits, Gold t represents gold holdings, SDR t represents country holdings of Special Drawing Rights, IM F captures the country's position with the IMF, while Other captures other reserve assets. Total reserves can grow from purchases of foreign currency assets, interest earned on existing assets, capital gains on existing assets and increases in non-currency asset holdings. Then, the change in reserves is given by:
where ∆N onCR = ∆Gold + ∆SDR + ∆IM F + ∆Other represent noncurrency reserves. We focus our empirical analysis on foreign currency reserves F orexR as they capture the type of liquid assets that central banks are more likely to use in the event of a crisis, as motivated by our model.
An additional reason to focus on foreign currency reserves is that Dominguez (2012) shows that non-currency reserves do not change frequently. We can then decompose data on international foreign currency reserve changes as:
where, ∆ SEC + ∆ DEP O represent non-interest related changes to holdings of international reserves.
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We can see from equation (25) Reserve template, which also provides aggregate quarterly data on SEC and DEP O for each country. The biggest challenge is to measure the relevant interest rates as they depend on the choice of currencies and assets by central banks, for which we have only approximate information. We turn to the measurement of interest earned and interest rate shocks in the next section.
Measurement of interest and interest-rate shocks
In this section we measure interest earned on reserve assets and the relevant interest-rate shocks for the countries in our sample. We take the perspective that country-specific factors determine the choice of currencies and maturities in which central banks accumulate international reserves. 11 Although data on the decomposition between securities and deposits/currency
11 Lim (2007) shows that exchange rate fluctuations lead to portfolio re-balancing, such that reserve currency shares are relatively stable. Beck and Rahbari (2011) study optimal central bank currency portfolios in a minimum variance framework with sudden stops.
They find that the US dollar is a better hedge against sudden stops in Asia and Latin
American, while the Euro is superior in Emerging Europe. Wooldridge (2006) documents that the composition of international reserve assets has changed within countries, both in terms of composition and currency denomination.
is available from the SDDS, unfortunately we do not have country-specific information on the currency composition of these assets for the full sample, nor on the exact assets held by each country. Therefore, we construct two different measures of country-specific interest rate shocks as proxies.
To proxy for returns to securities and returns to deposits we follow Dominguez et al. (2012) and collect 10-year government bond yields and 3-month interbank yields for the United States, Japan, Great Britain and the Euro-area.
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The first measure follows Dominguez et al. (2012) . We use the Currency
Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database to obtain currency weights for two groups of countries: "advanced" and "emerging and developing economies". We combine this data, data on asset composition from SDDS and returns for securities and deposits for four main reserve currencies to compute the country-specific interest rate as follows:
where i represents country, c = U SD, EU R, GBP, Y EN , w t,c captures each currency weight at time t and φ j t,c captures the interest rate on asset j = s, d, at time t for currency c.
Variation in this interest rate captures different holding patterns between
securities and deposits/currency across countries and within countries, but note that variation in currency denomination is exclusively between "advanced" and "emerging and developing economies". Figure 4 plots yields for one unit of foreign currency international reserves held as securities (10-year) and deposits/currency (3-month) weighted by currency share for "advanced"
and "emerging and developing economies". This figure shows that variation in currency composition between the two types of countries is small. In the empirical specifications, we will focus on within-country variation in reserve transfers and explore how interest rate shocks affect reserve transfers after controlling for country fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the country level in all regressions. Using this approach we can compute interest earned on reserve assets ( φ s SEC + φ d DEP O and obtain foreign currency inter-
We can also obtain the relevant interest rates for each country. Combining this data, we obtain quarterly data between 2000 and 2013 for 75 countries which we classify as advanced or developing according to the World Economic Outlook (WEO).
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Our alternative specification uses data from Wong (2007) for 23 countries for which we can obtain the currency breakdown in international reserve holdings for 2005. We assume that these weights are constant throughout our sample and compute: for cross-country variation in currency denomination. We present pooled regressions with standard errors clustered at the country level, but results with country fixed effects are similar.
[Insert Figure 4 here] Peru, the increase in interest rate increase following 2005 is associated with a higher level of transfers. In both countries, the period after the crisis is associated with lower reserve transfers. In the next sections we test for the relationship between interest rates and international reserve transfers using a panel of countries and quarterly data.
Data and country examples

Empirical strategy
To study the relationship between foreign currency international reserve transfers and interest rates, we employ variations of the following regression:
where
represents foreign currency international reserve transfers as a share of GDP for country i in quarter t, α i captures time-invariant country fixed effects, ψ t captures time fixed effects, ∆interest i,t−1 captures interest rate changes as described in the previous section, and Crisis i,t is a country-specific dummy variable that takes on a value 1 if country i is in a crisis period in quarter t. This crisis dummy is constructed based on peak-to-through seasonally-adjusted real GDP for the period after 2007 as by the Bank of Russia from 11 November to 31 December 2014 amounted to $11.9 billion."
(Page 54).
in Dominguez et al. (2012) , and is motivated by the dramatic decreases in reserves during country-specific crisis as shown in Figures 5 -6 . We will also consider the role of a global dummy that captures the US financial crisis in this period. The coefficient β measures the impact of changes in interest rate between t and t − 1 on reserve transfers at t. Note that reserve transfers captures reserve accumulation not coming from interest earned, but from net purchases or valuation effects of foreign currency international reserves.
17
This regression is potentially subject to endogeneity concerns. One of these concerns is that reserve accumulation in developing economies causes low interest rates in developed economies. Another is that interest rate changes may be associated with the valuation channel of international reserve accumulation. This could be a problem if the central bank is passively managing international foreign currency reserves, as increases in interest rates would mechanically affect reserve transfers through the valuation channel.
To reduce concerns about reserve causation, we look at lagged changes in interest rates, such that β measures the impact of changes in interest rates between t − 1 and t − 2 on reserve transfers at t. If asset price valuations of foreign currency international reserves are determined by interest rate shocks, these effects should be contemporaneous and not captured by lags.
18
17 We also perform an alternative regression where we include country-specific time trends ψ c .
18 These would not be a concern if the central bank is actively managing international foreign currency reserves, as net purchases would adjust to keep reserve transfers at the
Results
Columns (1) - (4) in Table 2 collect the results for the regression specification given by equation (28), with country fixed effects, while column (5) collects the results for the regression specification given by equation (29), with country-specific time-trends and country fixed effects. We can see in Column (1) from Table 2 that interest rate changes are positively associated with reserve transfers, and this effect is statistically different from zero at the 5% level. In Column (2) - (5) we interact our variable of interest with a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the country is an advanced economy. The coefficient β for developing countries, reported in line (1) increases in magnitude but is less finely estimated. In Column (3) we control for country-specific crises as defined in the previous section. Column (4) adds year fixed effects, while Column (5) reports results with country-specific time-trends. The coefficient of interest for developing economies is positive, although not very precisely estimated for some of our specifications. Looking at column (2), the interpretation of the coefficient is that a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate of foreign currency international reserves is associated with a 0.19 percentage points increase in foreign currency international reserve transfers as a share of GDP.
desired level following valuation shocks. Also, if interest rate increases actually decrease asset valuations, this effect would go against the effect we are studying in this paper. Results with contemporaneous interest changes are qualitatively similar but slightly smaller and less precisely estimated. Results with an additional lag, that is, where we study the relationship between interest changes between t − 2 and t − 3 and reserve transfers at t are of similar magnitude to the ones we present, but less precisely estimated.
(1) 
19
In Table 4 we use our alternative measure of interest rates in a setting without country fixed effects, but keeping standard errors clustered at the country level. We omit from these regressions the United States, Germany and United Kingdom, as these are reserve currency countries, and are left with 20 countries for which we have larger variation on the currency denomination of international reserve assets. Note that the coefficient of interest in very similar to the full sample, suggesting that interest rate changes impact reserve transfers.
Robustness
In this section we augment our empirical model with other considerations that can potentially drive reserve transfers. In particular, we consider two alternative mechanisms: exchange rate regimes and foreign-debt risk. One alternative theory to explain the patterns of international reserves is that they are the unintended consequence of a trade policy that tries to promote exports and growth (See Benigno and Fornaro (2012) and Korinek and Servén (2016) .). We include monthly data on de facto exchange rate regimes from Ilzetzki et al. (2010) . 20 If exchange rate regimes and trade policy are related to changes in interest rates, omitting exchange rate regimes could potentially bias our results. Looking at the first line in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 we can see that controlling for the exchange rate regime does not significantly alter our results.
The other explanation is closer to the mechanism studied in this paper. (1) Table 5 show that our results are also robust to controlling for foreign debt. We have taken the perspective that interest rate shocks are exogenous and unexpected to developing economies. We could solve for a more complicated model with expected interest rate shocks. The solution would fall in between the two long-run solutions we have focused on, but some interesting insights on changing probabilities of future rates could be obtained. On the empirical side, it would be interesting to extract shocks to interest rates in developed economies that are also exogenous in developed economies, and use these policy surprises to study reserves and interest rates.
One challenge with our approach is that it is hard to isolate the impact of interest rate shocks from global cycles, in particular given that our sample includes a global financial crisis and a post-crisis world that is rather unique.
Future work may benefit from more and better data. Finally, we have focused on interest rates but omitted the role of the social return on capital.
Incorporating both dimensions of holding international reserves, costs and returns, to compute the fiscal impact of the opportunity cost of international reserves would provide a clearer picture of international reserve management in a post-crisis world with potentially higher interest rates. 
